The air breathed in Dhaka has never been a more urgent priority. With the new government under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman taking office following the interim administration of Dr Muhammad Yunus, there is a unique window of opportunity to pivot from reactive measures to a sustained, aggressive strategy against the city’s choking smog.

Dhaka’s air quality frequently ranks as the worst in the world, with AQI levels often soaring into the “hazardous” category. While seasonal changes play a role, the structural causes — unregulated construction, brick kilns, and archaic transport systems — require more than just rhetoric; they require immediate short and medium-term interventions.

Short-term interventions

The most critical immediate step for the new administration is the enforcement of existing environmental laws. 

For too long, “pollution permits” have been unofficially granted through bureaucratic apathy. The government must immediately implement a “polluter pays” principle. 

The Department of Environment (DoE) needs the teeth to shut down illegal brick kilns that ring the capital. These kilns are responsible for nearly 58% of Dhaka’s fine particulate matter (PM2.5) during the dry season. 

A temporary moratorium on traditional brick production in the Greater Dhaka area, incentivising a shift to hollow blocks and green bricks, could yield visible results within months.

Next, the “dust-fest” caused by haphazard construction must end. The new government should mandate that all construction sites — both public and private — be fully shrouded.

Road-digging by utility services must be coordinated to ensure that half-finished projects aren’t left to dry and blow into the lungs of commuters. 

Water spraying on major arterial roads during peak dry hours should be a standard municipal duty, not an occasional luxury.

Medium-term structural shifts

The interim government initiated some progress toward a unified public transport system; the Rahman administration must now accelerate this. 

Dhaka’s reliance on thousands of dilapidated, black-smoke-spewing buses is a public health catastrophe. The transition to a unified bus franchise system is essential. 

By replacing the current chaotic competition between private operators with a streamlined, regulated fleet — ideally moving toward electric or CNG-run vehicles — the city can significantly reduce vehicular emissions.

Furthermore, the expansion of the Metro Rail (MRT) network remains the most viable long-term solution to decongesting the streets and cleaning the air.

Waste management is another medium-term battleground. The open burning of municipal waste at landfills releases toxic dioxins into the atmosphere. Investing in “waste-to-energy” plants and banning the open-air incineration of plastics and electronic waste will prevent these toxins from entering the capital’s air shed.

It is also important to note also that a lot of Dhaka’s pollution is “transboundary,” meaning it drifts in from the wider Indo-Gangetic Plain (India and Pakistan). 

Medium-term success will require regional cooperation to manage this shared air corridor. For this, it desperately needs an initiative through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc).

While most initiatives have so far been voluntary, focusing more on data sharing and monitoring rather than enforcing binding emission targets is needed now for all.

A new political will

Air pollution is not just an environmental issue; it is an economic and health crisis. It costs Bangladesh billions in lost productivity and healthcare expenses annually. 

The new government has been handed a mandate for change. By prioritizing breathable air, they aren’t just protecting the environment — they are protecting the very lives of the citizens who put them in power.

The technology and the policy frameworks already exist. What has been missing is the consistent political will to put public health over the interests of the “brick and transport” lobbies.

If the new government can successfully clear the skies of Dhaka, it will be the most visible sign of a truly new era for Bangladesh.

Printed in the Dhaka Tribune today  https://www.dhakatribune.com/amp/opinion/op-ed/406575/what-can-the-government-do-to-address-air

The current crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, as analysed in the FT and by organisations like the FAO and IFPRI, presents a “systemic shock” to agri food systems that mirrors the structural vulnerabilities seen during the 1943 and 1974 Bengal famines. While those historical famines were driven by wartime inflation and supply chain collapses, the present risk stems from the Strait’s role as the world’s primary “fertiliser and energy artery.”

The primary risks identified in the FT “Big Read” analysis and related reports include:

1. The Fertiliser “Double Whammy”

Unlike 1943, where the failure was largely administrative and logistical, a modern famine risk in South Asia is tied to chemical inputs.

• Production Halt: The Gulf region accounts for 30% of global nitrogen fertiliser trade and 45% of sulfur exports (essential for phosphate fertilisers). A blockade halts these shipments during the critical March/April planting season.

• Cost Surge: Middle East urea prices jumped nearly 20% in a single week. For farmers in Bangladesh and India, these costs can make planting the “Boro” (winter) rice crop—which is currently underway—prohibitively expensive or impossible.

2. Geographic Vulnerability (The “Bengal” Factor)

The FAO specifically identifies Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka as the most vulnerable.

• Import Dependency: These nations rely on the Strait for both finished fertilisers and the natural gas required to run domestic fertilizer plants. India has already had to scale back domestic production to 70% capacity due to fuel shortages.

• Yield Collapse: If the disruption persists for more than three months, a “yield shock” is predicted. In 1974, floods triggered the famine, but in 2026, the trigger is a man-made “input drought” that could lead to a massive drop in rice and wheat harvests.

3. Energy-Induced Food Inflation

The “Big Read” piece highlights that food security is now inseparable from energy security.

• Fuel for Irrigation: High oil prices (up 15% since the conflict began) increase the cost of diesel, which powers the water pumps essential for rice cultivation in the Bengal delta.

• Logistics: With 70,000 tons of food aid already stuck and shipping costs rising by up to 25%, the price of “getting food to the plate” is skyrocketing

The FT analysis rightly warns that while global food stocks are currently “sufficient,” the crisis is a race against time. If the blockade lasts through the 2026 planting cycle, the transition from a “price crisis” to a “supply famine” becomes a mathematical certainty for import-dependent nations in South Asia.

The main difference is that Middle East is a geopolitical term focused on Eurocentric, historical, and cultural ties, often including Egypt, while West Asia (or Southwest Asia) is a precise geographical term identifying the westernmost part of the Asian continent. Though West Asia usually excludes North African countries like Egypt.

The “Middle East” was coined by Western powers (UK/US) in the 20th century to describe the region relative to Europe (between the “Near” and “Far” East). “West Asia” is a neutral, academic, and modern geographical descriptor.

In terms of geographical coverage, the Middle East typically includes Egypt and sometimes parts of Turkey, while West Asia is strictly the western part of the Asian continent. As one can see there is commonality with both terms overlapping significantly, covering countries like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the UAE.

In usage it is noticable that “Middle East” is common in media and geopolitics, while “West Asia” is increasingly used to decolonize regional naming.

Whilst this is ture, the term “West Asia” is gaining popularity, particularly in international development and among nations in the region, because it lacks theEurocentric bias of “Middle East,” which suggests the region is “middle” only when viewed from Europe.

In the 250th anniversary celebrations of Adam Smith, we should not forget what he said about the East India Company who were given a Royal Charter to trade with Asia. 

Adam Smith famously condemned the East India Company (EIC) as a “strange absurdity” and a “nuisance in every respect,” focusing his critique on its status as a “bloodstained” monopoly that harmed both India and British consumers. He argued that separating sovereign power from commercial profit was disastrous, accusing the company of corruption, mismanagement, and horrific exploitation.

Smith’s critique of East India Company had three key aspects. Firstly it was a “Monopoly Nuisance”. Smith viewed the EIC’s exclusive trading privileges as a violation of free trade principles, arguing that such monopolies “burdened” consumers with high prices to maintain high profits for the company.

Secondly, he also commented  on their Misrule and Corruption. He accused the company of widespread “plunder” and mismanagement in Bengal, arguing that merchant companies are ill-equipped to act as sovereign rulers.

And finally he opposed their Expansion. Smith opposed the EIC’s territorial expansion in India, viewing the blending of trade and political rule as a “contradiction” between the company’s nationalist responsibility and the private interests of its merchants.

In his work, notably The Wealth of Nations, Smith emphasised that the “wretched spirit of monopoly” in the East Indies was economically and ethically disastrous for Great Britain. Smith believed the best way to correct these issues was to abolish the EIC’s monopoly, end their sovereign administration of Indian territory, and encourage free trade. So while Adam Smith wrote about the limits of mercantile administration in The Wealth of Nations he supported the termination of the firm’s charter. 

As a local resident in Marylebone, l have just had a flyer through my front door, about the imminent closure of the Westway & Marylebone flyover for critical maintenance works.  Looking at it does raise a number of questions about the displacement of traffic in this part of West London. 

For decades, Bangladesh has rightly described itself as one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable nations. Rising seas, stronger cyclones, salinity intrusion and flooding are not abstract projections here; they are lived realities. The international community broadly accepts that Bangladesh deserves climate finance and global support. That argument remains valid.

But a new and uncomfortable question is emerging at home: can Bangladesh continue to present itself primarily as a victim of climate change while remaining deeply dependent on imported fossil fuels that expose the country to economic and geopolitical shocks?

The energy crises of recent years have forced this debate into the open as well. 

Global disruptions—from the war in Ukraine to instability across the Middle East—have shown how vulnerable fuel-importing economies can be. Bangladesh’s power system, built heavily around natural gas, coal imports and purchased electricity, suddenly faced soaring costs, foreign currency pressure and periodic shortages. Load shedding returned, industrial confidence weakened, and energy subsidies strained public finances.

What became clear is that Bangladesh’s energy challenge is no longer only environmental. It is strategic.

Energy security and economic sovereignty are now inseparable.

Until recently, renewable energy policy in Bangladesh moved slowly. Solar targets were modest, implementation uneven, and fossil generation expanded rapidly to meet growing demand. The logic was understandable: fast industrialisation required reliable baseload power, and fossil fuels appeared to offer the quickest solution.

However, the global energy landscape has changed. Imported fuel is no longer predictably cheap. Exchange-rate volatility directly affects electricity prices. Every external crisis—from shipping disruptions to regional conflict—now carries domestic consequences for factories, households and government budgets.

In this context, renewable energy is being reconsidered not merely as climate policy, but as economic protection.

The most important shift since 2024 has been conceptual rather than technological. Policymakers increasingly view solar power, regional hydropower trade, and energy efficiency as tools to reduce exposure to international fuel markets. Rooftop solar installations on factories, commercial buildings and public institutions are gaining attention precisely because Bangladesh lacks abundant land for large renewable parks. Urban density, once seen as an obstacle, may become an advantage if millions of rooftops are turned into small power stations.

This transition will not be simple. Bangladesh has already invested heavily in conventional power plants under long-term contracts. Many facilities must continue operating to avoid financial penalties. Grid infrastructure requires modernisation before large volumes of variable renewable energy can be integrated. Financing gaps remain substantial, and private investment depends on regulatory stability.

Moreover, energy transitions are inherently political. Electricity tariffs affect voters directly. Industrial competitiveness depends on reliable supply. Governments must balance reform with social stability.

For these reasons, Bangladesh is unlikely to abandon fossil fuels overnight. Natural gas and nuclear power will remain important components of the energy mix for years to come. A realistic pathway involves gradual diversification rather than abrupt transformation.

Yet gradual does not mean passive.

The strategic opportunity facing the current government is to redefine Bangladesh’s climate narrative. Rather than positioning itself solely as a country awaiting compensation for damages caused elsewhere, Bangladesh could present itself as a nation actively reducing vulnerability through domestic innovation and resilience.

This shift matters internationally as well. Global supply chains are beginning to reward low-carbon manufacturing. Export industries—from garments to pharmaceuticals—will increasingly face sustainability requirements from European and North American markets. Cleaner electricity is becoming an economic asset, not just an environmental virtue.

There is also a generational dimension. Bangladesh’s young workforce will inherit an energy system built today. Continued dependence on imported fuels risks locking future growth into external price cycles beyond national control. Expanding renewable capacity, improving efficiency and strengthening regional electricity cooperation offer a pathway toward greater autonomy.

The debate, therefore, should not be framed as development versus climate responsibility. The real choice is between dependence and resilience.

Bangladesh cannot control global emissions trajectories or geopolitical conflicts. But it can control how exposed its economy remains to them.

A pragmatic energy transition—combining renewables, nuclear stability, smarter grids and reduced fuel imports—would strengthen economic security while reinforcing the country’s moral authority in global climate negotiations. Leadership on adaptation has already earned Bangladesh international respect. Leadership on energy transformation could define its next chapter.

The coming decade will determine whether Bangladesh remains primarily a frontline victim of climate change or becomes a model of how vulnerable nations adapt strategically to an uncertain world.

The opportunity now is not simply to demand justice, but to build independence.

Printed in the Dhaka Tribune on the 10th of March 2026 

Dhaka is currently facing a severe air pollution crisis, frequently ranking as the most polluted city in the world. As of late February 2026, the city has seen Air Quality Index (AQI) scores exceeding 330, classifying the air as “hazardous.” This spike is largely due to the dry winter season, which traps pollutants like fine particulate matter PM_2.5 near the ground. The primary contributors include unregulated brick kilns, massive construction projects, ageing vehicle fleets, and the open burning of municipal waste.

To address this, the Bangladesh government has recently outlined the National Air Quality Management Plan (NAQMP) 2024–2030. Here is a breakdown of the short and medium-term measures required to clear the air.

1. Short-Term Measures (Immediate Impact)

These actions focus on containment and public safety during peak pollution months.

• Dust Suppression: Mandatory twice-daily water sprinkling on major roads and around large-scale construction sites (e.g., Metro Rail, Elevated Expressway) to prevent dust from becoming airborne.
• Enforced Waste Management: Strict bans on the open-air burning of municipal solid waste, which contributes significantly to local $PM_{2.5}$ levels.
• Transportation Restrictions: Implementation of “low-emission zones” in hotspots like Motijheel, Farmgate, and Mirpur, alongside stricter enforcement of fitness certificates for aging, black-smoke-emitting buses.
• Brick Kiln Shutdowns: Temporary suspension of traditional, highly-polluting brick kilns located in the Dhaka periphery (Savar, Gazipur) during the peak winter months.
• Public Health Advisories: Real-time data sharing via apps and digital billboards to warn citizens to wear N95 masks and limit outdoor activities when AQI exceeds 200.

2. Medium-Term Measures (1–3 Years)

These aim to reform the structural causes of pollution.

• Transition to Green Bricks: Phasing out traditional coal-fired kilns in favor of Auto Bricks or concrete blocks. The government is already pushing for 100% block use in public construction.
• Vehicle Fleet Modernization: Accelerating the transition to electric buses for public transport and expanding the CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) infrastructure to reduce reliance on high-sulfur diesel.
• Industrial Regulation: Installing Continuous Emission Monitoring Systems (CEMS) in factories around Dhaka to ensure they adhere to the Air Pollution Control Rules 2022.
• Urban Greening: A “pilot project” to cover bare land in Dhaka North and South with grass and native trees to reduce soil erosion and dust.
• Clean Cooking Initiatives: Reducing household emissions by promoting improved cookstoves (ICS) and LPG, as nearly 50% of households still rely on solid fuels like wood and dung.

3. The “Airshed” Challenge

It is important to note that about 30–40% of Dhaka’s pollution is “transboundary,” meaning it drifts in from the wider Indo-Gangetic Plain (India and Pakistan). Medium-term success will require regional cooperation to manage this shared air corridor.

The debate over who should receive the largest share of a London tourist tax—formally known as an overnight visitor levy— will be one of the most contentious issues in the capital’s 2026 political landscape.

With current estimates suggesting a 3–5% levy could raise between £240 million and £350 million per year, there are three primary groups making a play for the “lion’s share.”

1. The Local Boroughs: “The Mitigation Argument”

Central London boroughs—particularly Westminster, Camden, and Kensington & Chelsea—argue they should keep at least 50% to 100% of the revenue generated within their borders. The Logic begin that these councils bear the direct “wear and tear” of tourism. They pay for street cleaning, waste management, and public safety in high-traffic areas like Leicester Square and Soho as well as its impact on the local housing market based on hotel stays and particularly short term lets. 

They perspective is that their residents shouldn’t have to subsidise the services tourists use. Westminster alone could generate over £95 million annually; local leaders argue this money should be ring-fenced for local improvements rather than disappearing into a central pot.

2. City Hall (GLA): “The Infrastructure Argument”

The Mayor’s office and the Greater London Authority (GLA) are pushing for a model where the majority (potentially two-thirds) goes to the center.

Their logic is that tourism is a city-wide phenomenon. Most visitors don’t stay in just one borough; they use the Tube, visit museums across London, and benefit from city-wide policing.

Revenue from tourist tax also be could be the “silver bullet” for stalled infrastructure projects, such as the Bakerloo Line extension or the DLR extension to Thamesmead.

It would thus follows the “Paris Model,” where the regional authority uses visitor taxes to fund the massive transport network that makes tourism viable in the first place.

3. The Tourism & Hospitality Sector: “The Reinvestment Argument”

While industry bodies and Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) argue that if a tax is collected, it should be ring-fenced for the industry itself. Their logic is a tourist tax increases the cost of a stay, which could make London less competitive compared to cities like Paris or Dubai.

So their counter-proposal is they want the largest share to go toward international marketing (via London & Partners) and securing major events (like the MTV Awards or the Brits) to ensure a steady stream of future visitors. This mirrors the “Manchester Model,” where the industry-led levy is spent specifically on boosting the “visitor economy.”

So some of the proposed shares, are as follows in the table below; 

Finally we have the  “Fairness” Dilemma. There is also a  growing concern regarding geographic equity within London. If the tax is kept where it is collected, “rich” boroughs like Westminster will get even wealthier, while “outer” boroughs that may host tourists but have fewer hotels (like Brent or Hounslow) see very little benefit. This is why many economists suggest a hybrid model: A local portion to cover immediate council costs; a central portion for transport and finally a redistribution portion to help less-visited areas develop their own attractions.

Several global cities have implemented tourist taxes with distinct models for how the money is shared and spent. The distribution usually follows one of three patterns: a split with regional government, a direct “livability” fund, or a ring-fenced infrastructure budget.

1. The Regional Split: Barcelona & Paris

These cities share the revenue between the local municipality and the broader regional government.

• Barcelona: The tax is actually two separate fees. One is a regional tax (Catalonia) and the other is a city surcharge.
  • Distribution: Barcelona keeps 100% of its local surcharge but only about 50% of the regional portion.
  • Usage: The city’s share is explicitly used for local projects like improving escalators in hilly neighborhoods, cleaning public restrooms at beaches, and funding “Bus Barri” (neighborhood bus) services that locals use to avoid tourist-clogged routes.
• Paris: The Taxe de Séjour is split between the City of Paris, the Department, and the Île-de-France region.
  • Distribution: Recently, a massive 200% surcharge was added specifically for the regional transport authority (Île-de-France Mobilités).
  • Usage: While the base tax helps tourism promotion, the new surcharges are almost entirely dedicated to expanding and modernizing the regional Metro and rail networks to handle the influx of visitors (especially post-Olympics).

2. The General Fund & Buy-Back Model: Amsterdam

Amsterdam has one of the highest tourist taxes in the world, and it treats the revenue as a tool for “balance.”

• Distribution: The funds go into the city’s general budget, but the city is increasingly “hypothecating” (earmarking) it for resident-facing issues.
• Usage:
  • City Center Livability: A portion of the revenue is used for a “property fund” where the city buys back buildings in the Red Light District to prevent them from becoming more tourist shops or “budget” hotels, converting them back into housing or artisanal shops for locals.
  • Public Services: Large sums are diverted to street cleaning, youth care services, and “green” infrastructure like the IJ waterway cycle bridge.

3. The Heritage & Entry Model: Venice

Venice is unique because it taxes both overnight guests (via hotel tax) and “hit-and-run” day-trippers (via the new entry fee).

• Distribution: Managed almost entirely at the municipal level.
• Usage: The revenue is heavily focused on the physical preservation of the city. It funds the maintenance of historic landmarks like St. Mark’s Basilica and the cleaning of canals. It also covers the high cost of waste collection in a city where everything must be moved by boat.

London is currently debating its own model, and the “distribution” question is the biggest sticking point. The Conflict is principally between Central boroughs like Westminster, Kensington & Chelsea and Camden argue they should keep at least 50% with Westminster City Council taking up the bulk of the revenue because they host the vast majority of hotels and suffer the most “wear and tear.” Within the counter-argument: from the Mayor’s office for a more “city-wide” distribution to fund the transport network (TfL) that brings tourists into those central areas from the outskirts.